Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1959

Annie B. Evans v. Morgan Evans : Brief of Appellant
on Motion for Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Patrick H. Fenton; Attorney for Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, Evans v. Evans, No. 8802 (Utah Supreme Court, 1959).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3026

This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

'I

..
~

In The \
~upreme

~I

, . ~ · · .' '

1\ .

\~~·

Court of the State of Utah

·I

.. -

:;

:

(i'
,J

I.

;:

j

1

•,

<I
i

'

'

I

~

~NIE

B. EVANS, Administratrix of the

I

~tate

of William H. Evans, Deceased,
Plaintiff & Respondent

Civil 8802
APPELLANT'S

vs
BRIEF
ON MOTION

40RGAN EVANS,
Defendant & Appellant.

FOR REHEARING

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
PATRICK H. FENTON,

Attorney for Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------------------------- 2
STATEMENT OF POINT:S ---------------------------------------------------- 4
ARGUMENT -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
Point 1. The decision of the Supreme Court filed 8 July
1958 fails to answer Roint No. 1 of the appeal ________ 4
Point 2. A trial court has a duty to enfiorce ethical
standards of the Bar and to stop violations of
same committed in the court's presence ____________________ 6
CONCLUSIONS -------------------------------------------------------------------- 11
STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Annotated 1953:
Titie
Ti tie
Ti tie
Ti tie

78-51-26 -------------------------------------------------------------------78-51-19 -------------------------------------------------------------------78-32-1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------78-32-11 --------------------------------------------------------------------

7
7
8
8

CASES CITED
Higgins vs. Burton, Judge
64 Utah 562, 232 P. 914 -------------------------------------------------- 8
Wilson vs. Wahl
182 Kansas 532, 322 P 2d 804 ---------------------------------------- 8
State of Kansas vs. Leigh
178 Kansas 549, 289 P 2d 774 -------------------------------------- 9
TEXTS CITED
The Utah Bar Bulletin, November, 1952:
The Revised Rules .of the Utah State Bar Governing
Professional Conduct and Discipline -------------------------- 5
The Utah Bar Bulletin, November, 1952:
Canons of Judicial Ethics ------------------------------------------------------ 7
Corpus Juris Secundum:
Volume 7, Page 845 ------------------------------------------ _________ ---~ _ 9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In The
Supreme Court of the State of Utah
ANNIE B. EVANS, Administratrix of the

Estate of William H. Evans, Deceased,
Plaintiff & Respondent

Civil 8802
APPELLANT'S

vs
BRIEF
ON MOTION

MORGAN EVANS,
Defendant & Appellant.

FOR REHEARING

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
-PATRICK H. FENTON,
Attorney for Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This matter was tried before a jury commencing on
Thursday, 14 November, 1957, and concluding on Monday, 18 November, 1957. William H. Evans, deceased, had
been married to Annie B. Evans during his lifetime a·nd
left Annie B. Evans as his widow at the time of his death.
The defendant and appellant, Morgan Evans, was the
brother of William H. Evans, deceased. During the lifetime of William H. Evans, deceased, said William H.
Evans and his wife had lived the major portion of their
married life in houses belonging to Morgan Evans.
In her comp~laint the plaintiff asked for the ownership of one half of certain cattle branded 44. The defendant denied that the plaintiff owned any interest in said
cattle in his answer and cross complaint, but admitted
that certain grazing rights and farm land that had been
used in connection with said cattle were jointly owned by
the defendant and William H. Evans, deceased, during
the lifetime of said William H. Evans, deceased. Defendant also asked for the partition of the farm land. Defendant also had an alternative prayer whereby defendant asked the trial court, in the event said trial court
found on the ownership of cattle issue for the plaintiff,
for money expended in caring for said cattle. Both parties joined in asking the court to sell said farm land and
to divide the money derived therefrom.
Durham Morris, Esquire, attorney for the plaintiff,
had entered in the employment of William H. Evans, deceased, and Morgan Evans, prior to the death of said
William H. Evans, deceased, to arrange a collection of
certain money from D. G. Page, and did so, and was to
follow up the collection and was to receive 25% of said
items for his services. That the last payment thereunder
was received under the terms of said settlement in 1958
and after deducting 25% therefrom said attorney paid
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the balance over to the parties herein named. That until
this last playment was collected in 1958 and disbursed
said attorney was employed from several years prior to
the commencement of this action to the time of said disbursement by said William H. Evans, deceased, and Mor~
gan Evans. That at the time this action was commenced
by said attorney the D. G. Page item was not completed,
and said attorney, Durham Morris, at the time he commenced the above entitled action, as attorney for the
plaintiff, was actually employed by the defendant, Morga·n Evans, in a professional capacity as an attorney at
law to complete the collection of the The D. G. Page
item. And that after the trial of the above entitled action said attorney completed the D. G. Page item by collecting the last payment to become due on the D. G. Page
item, deducting his 25% thereof, and then paying the balance to the parties of this action. _That Morgan Evans
received his money out of said payment, after the filing
of notice of appeal in the above entitled matter. That
until the payment of said money Durham Morris, Esquire,
was employed by l\iorgan Evans, the defendant above
named, as an attorney to perform a professional job, until
after notice of appeal in this rna tter was filed.
During the trial of the above entitled matter, said
Attorney, Durham IVI:orris, Esquire, volunteered 1nany
items as exhibits, that came into his possession as attorney in the D. G. Page item, without the consent of Morgan Evans and over his objection. That this action prejudiced the jury to such a point that a fair and impartial
trial was not had. That at the time these items \Yere volunteered they were volunteered by an attorney employed
by Morgan Evans and said items had been turned to
said attorney as part of his then existing employment by
Morgan Evans. That when these items and actions were
objected to on the basis of an existing attorney and client
relationship and that said items were being volunteered
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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out of an existing attorney and client relationship the
trial court overruled the objections and allowed said exhibits to go to the jury.
The jury found for the plaintiff on most issues with
some monetary items to the defendant to pay for the expenses he had incurred in runni'ng said cattle. The jury
found that each of the parties owned an undivided onehalf interest in said cattle.
That all the evidence the plaintiff presented was
either turned to said attorney through the D. G. Page
item, or the existance of said evidence ascertained
through familiarity with the D. G. Page item.
That on appeal the defendant presented two points:
1. That the trial court erred in allowing this matter to be
presented to the jury at all after the disclosure of an
existing attorney and client relationship between the
plaintiff's attorney and the defendant, and, 2. That the
trial court erred in failing to allow a portion of defendant's objection to plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs and
Disbursements.
That in its decision filed 8 July, 1958, the Supreme
Court of Utah affirmed the trial court except as to point
No.2.
STATEMENT OF POINTS

1. The decision of the Supreme Court filed 8 July,
1958 fails to answer Point No. 1 of the appeal.
2. A trial court has a duty to enforce ethical standards of the Bar and to stop violations of same committed
in the court's presence.

ARGUMENT
1. That the decision of the Supreme Court filed 8
July, 1958, fails to answer point No: 1 of the appeal.
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Point No. 1 as raised by the appeal was "The trial
court erred in allowing this matter to be presented to the
jury at all after the disclosure of an existing attorney
and client relationship between the plaintiff's attorney
a·nd the defendant."
The undersigned's examination of said decision entirely fails to find an answer to this question. Apparently the Supreme Court based its decision upon violation
of the confidences, as did the trial court that tried the
matter and did ·not rule upon the question of whether or
not the trial court erred in allowing the rna tter to be
presented to the jury after the disclosure of an existin~
attorney and client relationship.
No one can question the existance of an attorney and
client re'lationship between Durham Morris, Esquire, and
Morgan Evans, at the time of the filing of the complaint
and the trial on the above entitled matter. At the time
of the identification of Exhibit "1" shown on page 9, Line
11 of the transcript of trial and continuing therein to
page 13, line 26, the attorney and client relationship was
defi'nitely shown. This was within the first 30 minutes
of the presention of the evidence. At that time it was
clearly shown by vior dire that the exhibit was bein~
volunteered out of an existing attorney and client relationship and without the consent of Morgan Evans. For
four days of trial work this continued.
No one can question that this conduct was a serious
violations of the ethical standards of the Utah State Bar.
The following quotations are taken from the Revised
Rules of the Utah State Bar governing professional Conduct and Discipline as adopted May 28, 1936, and approved by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah March
1, 1937, with amendments effective March 29, 1940 and
June 18, 1952 as published in the November 1952 issue
of "The Utah Bar Bulletin."
"Rule III, Conduct prescribed by rule."
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"6. Adverse influence and conflicting interests."
"It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to
disclose to the client all the circumstances of his relations to the parties, and and interest in or connection
\vith the controversy which might influence the client in
the selection of counsel.
"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning
of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests
when in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for
that which duty to another client requires him to oppose."
Under these circumstances there can be no question
that at the time of the trial of this case before a Beaver
County Jury, when there was an admitted attorney and
client relationship between the plaintiff's attorney and
the defendant that a serious ethical violation on conflict of interests was brought to light and objected to
and the trial court overruled the objection. The Suprerne
Court's decision filed 8 July, 1958, does not discuss thi.s
conflict of interest question but is based upon violation
of confidences instead. There is no question that Point
No. 1 of the appeal has not been answered by the Suprement Court decision.
2. A trial court has a duty to enforce ethical standards of the Bar and to stop violations of same committed
in the court's presence.
Most ethical violations are committed outside the
courtroom and under circumstances that usually a court
never becomes aware of. However, in this matter the
violation was brought out and shov1s as a matter of record. The trial court became aware of same in the early
hours of the trial. This then raises the question as to the
duty of the trial court regarding attorneys committing
ethical violations in the court's presence. Reference is
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made to Canons of Judicial Ethics, adoped at the annual
meeting of the Utah State Bar on June 15, 1951, and approved by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah June
18, 1952 as published in the November 1952 issue of the
Utah Bar Bulletin. On page 18 is the following:
"No. 11, Unprofessional Conduct of Attorneys and
Counsel.
·
A judge should utilize his opportunities to criticize
and correct unprofessional conduct of attorneys and
counsellors, brought to his attention; and if adverse comment is not a sufficient corrective, should send the matter
at once to the proper investigating and disciplinary authorities."
At the time of the trial of this matter the trial judge
not only failed to follow this requirement but overruled
objections based upon this requirement and condoned a
continued conflict of interest to the irreparable damage
of the defendant.
Trial judges have authority to regulate their courts
and punish improper conduct of attorneys committed in
the court's presence, both statutory and common law.
Utah ·code Annotated 1953, Title 78-51-26, "Duties
of Attorneys and Counsellors. It is the duty of an attornney and counsellor."
"(9) to comply with all duls approved rules and
regulations prescribed by the board of commissioners of
the Utah State Bar and to pay the fees provided by law."
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Title 78-51-19. "Review
by Supreme Court. Inhere·nt .powers of courts not affected.
Upon the making of any order by the board recommending the discipline, suspension or disbarment of any member of the Utah State Bar from the practice of law, the
board shall cause a certified copy thereof to be filed with
the clerk of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court may
review the action of the board, and may on its own motion and without the certification of any record inquire
into the merits of the case, and take any action agreeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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able to its judgment. Nothing in this title contained
shall be construed as limiting or altering the powers of
the courts to disbar or discipline members of the bar.
In addition the power of contempt may be used in a
r:1a tter of this nature.
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Title 78-32-1. "Acts and
Omissions constituting contempt. The following acts or
omissions in respect to a court or preceedings therein are
contempt of the authority of the courts:
(3) Misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or
violation of duty by an attorney, counsel, clerk, sheriff,
or other person appointed or elected to perform a judicial
or ministerial service."
Utah Code Annotated 1953, T1tle 78-32-11. ''Damages to party aggrieved. If an actual loss or injury to a
party in an action or special proceeding, prejudicial to
his rights therein, is caused by the contempt, the court,
in addition to the fine or imprisonment imposed for
the contempt or in place thereof, may order the person
proceeded against to pay the party aggrieved a sum of
money sufficient to indemnify him and to satisfy his
costs and expenses; which order and the acceptance of
money under it is a bar to an action by the aggrieved
party for such loss and injury."
The supreme court of the state of Utah has upheld
the power of a trial court to discipline attorneys. In the
case of Higgins vs. Burton, Judge, 64 Utah 562, 232 I).
914 Higgins had been denied the right to practice in the
Fifth District Court for an act or acts not discussed but
for which there had been no heari'ng. The Supreme Court
held that the trial judge had this power but not without
a hearing.
Other states have held that an attorney should disqualify himself on a conflict of interest matter and that
if he does not do so that the trial judge should stop sai.d
attorney from appearing. Kansas has so ruled on both
civil and criminal rna tters. In Wilson vs. Wahl, 182 Kansa.s
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532 322 P2d. 804 in a' matter in which arose out of an ex·
plosion when Wilson a·nd others lived in a building that
was damaged by what was apparently a natural gas ex~
plosion attributed to a leak in lines of city of Lyons, Kansas.Wahl filed statutory claim for Wilson and others and
then appeared at the trial as special counsel for the city.
The Kansas Court held that Wahl should have disqualified himself and that upon his failure to do so the trial
court should have disqualified him. In State of Kansas vs.
Leigh, 178 Kansas, 549 289 P2d. 774 Defendant was charged with burglary. Attorney, then a candidate for county
attorney counseled with defendant at request of defendant's wife. Attorney was then elected county attorney
and appeared as prosecutor. Kansas court held that the
prosecutor should have disqualified himself and voluntarily withdrawn and that upon his failure to do so, it became the trial court's duty to forbid said attorney further
participation therein.
The long standing obligation of the courts to force
upholding standards of ethics is well expressed in 7 Corpus Juris Secundom, Attorney and Client, Section 58.
The section commences on page 842, at page 843 is the
following:
Attorneys are subject to the supervision and control
of the courts and the power of the court to make reasonable rules and regulations regarding the conduct of attorneys is not open to question. It is the duty of the
courts to see to it that attorneys live up to their obligations, a·nd to see that the profession is confined to professional service, by professional means; and to lend no
sanction to unprofessional service, and it has been held
the inhere·nt duty of all courts to support the ethical
standing of the bar by impressing upon its members the
duty of holding sacred the confidence which should and
must ever exist between attorney and client.
The canons of ethics adopted by a bar association,
\vhile they do not have the effect of statutes, are bindSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
ing on attorneys. The authority of the canons of ethics is
derived, not from the fact that they are approved by the
bar association, but because they are statements of principles and rules accepted and acknowledged by reputable
attorneys and are recognized and applied by the courts
in proper cases."
Hence a trial court has the duty to enforce the ethical standards of the bar and to stop attorneys when they
do not voluntarily withdraw whe:n there develops a conflict of interest. In the case at hand when the existing
attorney and client relationship between plaintiff's attorney and the defendant was shown to the trial court,
when said attorney failed to withdraw the trial court
had a well established duty to protect said ethical standards and the trial should have been stopped until other
counsel became available and the court's failure to stop
same is error so prejudicial that another trial will not
cure this matter. Therefore the Supreme Court should
reverse the trial court entirely and failure to do so puts
the Supreme Court as well as the trial court in a position
of condoning ethical misconduct in the presence of the
court. It cannot be said that ethics do not apply in the
courtroom. It cannot be said that ethics have ·not been
violated in the trial court in this matter. It cannot be
said that the trial court is free from a duty of enforcement when violations of ethics are committeed in the
presence of the trial court. Yet apparently the trial court
has failed its duty in this rna tter and has openly con·
doned injury to a litigant caused by an attorney's conflict of interest and appearing against an individual for
whom said attorney is worki'ng and volunteering exhibits
and information provided by said litigant in another
matter on which said attorney is retained and working
for said litigant. Is this justice? If this is to be condoned
by the trial court and the Supreme Court of Utah then
and in that event of what purpose are the Canons of
ethics?
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CONCLUSIONS
That Durham Morris, Esquire, appeared at attornev
for the plaintiff above named while still working f~r
and employed by the defendant above named, and was
paid for work that he did for the defendant, after soappearing. That he volunteered information and exhibits
gained out of his employment by Morgan Evans and used
them agai'nst Morgan Evans while still working for Morgan Evans. That he should not have appeared in this
matter on either side of said action. That in so doing he
viola ted Rue III, Section 6, Adverse Influence and Conflicti'ng interests, of said canons of ethics. That this was
objected to and the trial court overruled the objections.
That the trial court has a duty of enforcement of said
canons of ethics and the trial court's failure to enforce
same resulted in irreparable damage and injury to the
defendant Morga:n Evans. That a trial court has a duty to
enforce ethical standards of the Bar and to stop violations of same committed in the court's presence. That the
decision .of the Supreme Court filed 8 July, 1958 fails to
answer Point No. 1 raised by the appeal. That the trial
court erred in allowing this matter to be presented to
the jury at all after the disclosure of an existing attorney
and client relationship between the plaintiff's attorney
and the defendant.
Respectfully submitted,
PATRICK H. FENTON
Attorney for Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

